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A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER. By Earl W. Kintner. London:
The McMillan Company. 1970. 'Pp. xii, 396. $8.95
It is seldom that a lawyer successfully authors a book directed
to practicing lawyers, students, and businessmen alike. One key
to success in such an endeavor seems to be in finding a topic of
great complexity about which few persons possess expertise, but with
which those enjoying or striving for success in the business world
should be at least generally familiar. A Robinson-Patman Primer,
written by a lawyer with exceptional qualifications,1 deals with a
poorly charted and increasingly complex segment of antitrust legis-
lation. A lack of general knowledge in this area can cause tragedy
for the businessman, confusion for the student, and embarrassment
for the attorney. The author is remarkably successful in providing
a tool for each of these groups.
The final version of the Robinson-Patman Act,' enacted in 1936
and supplemented in 1938, was the result of severe legislative com-
promise following extensive hearings, lobbying, and amendments.3
"As a result, the end product is not the hallmark of clarity"4 -
a conclusion which many antitrust scholars might nominate for the
understatement of the year. But amid the confusion and complexity
of the Act lie vital provisions for the prohibition of discriminatory
practices which injure competition.5 These provisions are enforce-
able under existing civil sanctions of the Clayton Act, which may be
imposed through suits by the Federal Trade Commission, 6 the Depart-
ment of Justice,7 and private complainants. 8 In addition, criminal
sanctions may be imposed through suits by the Justice Department
under the provisions of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman ActY
These provisions "have been attacked for vagueness and characterized
as both inconsistent and redundant with the other provisions of the
1 Earl W. Kinter has served with the Federal Trade Commission as a trial attorney,
legal advisor, General Counsel, member, and Chairman. He is currently a senior
partner in Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn of Washington, D.C.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
3 See E. KuINNR, A RoBINSoN-PATMAN PRIMER 11-16 (1970).
-Id. at 14.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1964).
6 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964).
71d. § 15a.
81d. § 15.
9 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).
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act."1 It is readily understandable why there is a lack of expertise
about this Act; yet its importance to the practicing attorney, business-
man, and student is obvious.
The author approaches the Act pragmatically," attempting to
explain it rather than criticize it. As a result, A Robinson-Patman
Primer, although more detailed than most introductory definitions
directed to laymen, 12 provides the businessman with a comprehensive
overview of the Act, presented in a dear and well-organized style.
And for the businessman who finds the book too detailed, or who
wants a simplified presentation for his subordinates, the book con-
tains an 18-page "bird's-eye view" of the Act.'"
Recognizing that "Ithe comparative youth of our antitrust stat-
utes, their ambitious scope, and their undoubted complexity have,
unfortunately, produced a number of questionable judicial deci-
sions,' '14 the author presents, with appropriate caution, a summary
of holdings from the more difficult cases.' 5 He challenges the courts
to resolve existing conflicts,16 and, when an issue has remained un-
resolved or confused by the decisions, he presents guidelines in lay-
men's terms which the businessman can follow.' 7 For example,
when presenting the complex area of brokerage payments, the au-
thor states:
This section is aimed at reaching dummy brokerage payments
that are in reality "under the table" price concessions eventually
falling into the hands of the buyer. Section 2(c), being self-con-
tained, does not permit a defense of meeting competition or cost
justification. Also, unlike Section 2(a), only one transaction -
one payment by a seller to a buyer's broker - comprises a Section
2(c) violation, and a specific effect on competition need not be
shown.' 8
In addition, the author alerts the reader to potential developments, 9
10 E. KINTNER, supra note 3, at 266.
11 "Like Mount Everest, it is still very much there, very much a challenge that must
be met and understood by responsible businessmen." Id. at 310.
12 See Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinso-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L. REV.
197.
13 E. KInTER, supra note 3, at 17.
14 Id. at 314.
15 See, e.g., id. at 57, where the author reviews the landmark decision, FTC v.
Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
16 See, e.g., E. KIsNWER, supra note 3, at 59.
17 See, e.g., id. at 68-71 (discussing the "same seller" requirement).
18 1d. at 29.
19See, e.g., id. at 270, where the potential personal liability of a corporate execu-
tive involved in section 3 litigation is considered.
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and whenever possible he outlines the elements upon which a change
will depend.
The student and the attorney will find the author's presentation
of the jurisdictional requirements of section 2(a) 20 very helpful.
After listing the elements necessary for a violation of section 2 (a) ,21
the author discusses each element separately. Although this discus-
sion may in some parts become too detailed for the layman, a general
understanding can be gained by reading the introductory paragraph
to the chapter, which includes the listing of the elements, and then
reading the initial paragraph of the respective subsections. The
above method of presentation, which is followed generally through-
out the book, will be particularly appealing to the Robinson-Patman
Act novice. Although there is an obvious danger of oversimplifi-
cation in this approach to the Act, it will be of great assistance to
the businessman reviewing his practices, the student trying to grasp
the fundamentals, and the general practitioner considering litigation.
The more sophisticated antitrust lawyer might even find this ap-
proach helpful as a checdist in his everyday practice.
Subsequent chapters give a general explanation of competitive
and anticompetitive effects under section 2 (a) and of competitive in-
jury under that section. The author also presents helpful explana-
tions of the defenses to charges of Robinson-Patman violations, de-
voting chapters to both the cost justification defense and the meet-
ing competition defense. The prohibition against the granting of
allowances in lieu of brokerage fees, the provision forbidding pro-
motional allowances, and the buyer inducement or receipt of discrimi-
nation provision are treated in separate chapters. In the final
chapters, the author gives a brief sketch of what the reader might
expect as a defendant to an action by the Federal Trade Commission,
the Department of Justice, or a private party.
The appendices include the texts of the Robinson-Patman and
Federal Trade Commission Acts, FTC Guides, digests of selected
FTC Advisory Opinions, and compliance suggestions for the broker-
age provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The student and practicing attorney might find that the absence
201d. at 35-91.
2 1 In order to bring the substantive portions of the act into play, there must be
(1) two or more consummated sales, (2) reasonably dose in point of time,
(3) of commodities, (4) of like grade and quality, (5) with a difference in
price, (6) by the same seller, (7) to two or more different purchasers, (8) for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any territory thereof,
(9) which may result in competitive injury. Furthermore, (10) the "com-
merce" requirement must be satisfied. Id. at 35.
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of footnotes casts suspicion upon the authority of many of the state-
ments. The appendices, however, include a selected bibliography
corresponding to chapters in the text and containing reference ma-
terials, cases, and citations which support and document the text.
This bibliography provides a research tool for each general subject,
but it fails to provide the reader with a ready reference for specific
points of discussion.2 Although this arrangement decreases the
value of -the book to researchers, it provides a readable text for the
layman, who may find constant citation burdensome. And it still
serves as a general research tool for the practicing attorney, who can
find at least the leading cases and texts in the bibliography. The
researcher will be even more disappointed with the surprising lack of
law review articles in the bibliography. But this deficiency will un-
doubtedly be of greater significance to the student than to the lay-
man or attorney.
Compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act is a necessity for the
maintenance of the American system of free enterprise. Although
many authorities have advocated the development of voluntary com-
pliance programs by businessmen,' the achievement of this goal
has been thwarted by the business community's inability to under-
stand the Act. A Robinson-Patman Primer, by explaining the pro-
visions of the Act in laymen's terms, makes a valuable contribution
to the goal of voluntary compliance.
G. DAvID SCHIERING*
HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL IN OHIO. By Victor M.
Victoroff and Hugh A. Ross. Cleveland: The Press of Case Western
Reserve University. 1969. Pp. xxii, 353. $8.95.
This book is intended to be a manual for physicians, hospital
staffs, attorneys, law enforcement officers, mental health workers,
22 See, e.g., id. at 187-88, where the author, in discussing when a seller is beating
rather than meeting a lower price, refers to "a leading case," "other situations," "the
1955 Attorney General's Report," and "the cases," but gives no indication of what
the cases are or where they can be found. For additional examples, see id. at 276-78.
23 See, e.g., Birdzell, What Can Be Done to Minimize Danger of Antitrust Litiga-
tion? Preventive Measures, Handling Government Investigations and the Roles of
Corporate Counsel and Outside Counsel, 38 ABA ANTnTRUST SECTION 126 (1969);
Curtis, Pursuit of Happiness Under the Antitrust Laws: Corporate Planning to Preserve
Liberty and Property, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 97 (1962); Monroe, Voluntary Compliance
Programs, 22 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 65 (1970) (supra in this issue); Van Cise,
Problems and Procedures of Counsel in Advising on Compliance with the Antitrust
Laws, 5 ANITRUST BULL. 221 (1960); Withrow, Making Compliance Programs Work,
17 Bus. LAw. 877 (1962).
* J.D., University of Cincinnati, admitted to the Ohio Bar, 1970, and presently a
practicing attorney in Cincinnati, Ohio.
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and the. general public. Its ambitious intent is successfully exe-
cuted. Anyone expecting the literary product of a law professor
(Ross) and a psychiatrist (Victoroff) to be an incomprehensible
blend of legalese and psychiatric jargon need not be apprehensive.
This book is a remarkably concise and dear description of the
medical and legal aspects of mental illness in Ohio.
The book is designed primarily to aid the Ohio physician who is
not a psychiatrist and who more than likely has no knowledge of
the laws and procedures affecting the disposition of mentally ill
patients. 'In practice, fewer than 10 percent of Ohio's physicians
are familiar with the treatment facilities for, and the possible legal
ramifications of, hospitalizing the mentally ill.' Since more than
half the psychiatric patients hospitalized in Ohio are admitted
through the efforts of physicians who are not psychiatrists, this
lack of knowledge can present serious problems.'
The book has two major divisions. The first, entitled 'Medical
Aspects," lists and describes the roles of the medical, paramedical,
law enforcement, and judicial specialists who might become in-
volved in the handling of mentally ill patients. The several kinds
of private and public hospital facilities available for short-term or
long-term treatment of disturbed patients are also set forth and dif-
ferentiated. The last part of this division contains capsule descrip-
tions of the most common types of psychiatric disturbances.
Thd second division, entitled "Legal Aspects," begins by setting
forth Ohio's legal definition of mental illness and explaining such
ramification as criminal responsibility, competency, and guardian-
ship. The procedures for both voluntary and involuntary hospital
admission are outlined. - The legal and medical rights of a mental
patient are spelled out: for example, the right to continuing diag-
nosis, the right to release, and the right to communicate with per-
sons outside the hospital. These rights are embodied in section 1 of
the Ohio hospitalization statute - a law for which the authors
are largely responsible.4  Also discussed is the conflict between the
right of the doctor and patient to a confidential relationship and
the need for full disclosure to the probate judge who, in'Ohio at
I V. VIcToRoFF & H. ROSS, HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL IN OHIo at xix
(1969).
21d.
3 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 5122.25-.31 (Page 1970). See also V. ViCrOROFF &
H. Ross, supra note 1, at 138.
4 Ewing, Preface to V. VIcToRoFF.& I-. Ross, supra note 1, at viii.
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least, must ultimately determine such issues as involuntary admis-
sion, release, guardianship, and competency.
The final 150 pages are devoted to five appendices which list,
among other things, Ohio's psychiatrists, psychiatric facilities, and
probate courts, as well as the public and private organizations con-
cerned in some way with the care of the mentally ill or retarded.
That these appendices will probably not need revising or updating
for some time is a sad commentary on the State's static response to
its mental health needs.
Apart from an objective one and one-half page appraisal of the
"Ohio Situation,'" 5 it is possible to read this book without getting a
visceral awareness of the disgraceful mental health situation in Ohio.
By failing both to delineate the inadequacies of the present system
and to make forceful recommendations for remedial action, the au-
thors missed a timely opportunity to instruct those groups most able
to bring about pressure for necessary changes. The authors point
out that "the treatment of child psychiatric conditions and delin-
quency [are] two of the most serious areas of deficiency in the state
system." 6 But they fail to mention that for a recent 12-month period
Ohio ranked 41st in the nation in per capita maintenance expendi-
tures for mental health,7 and ranked last in these expenditures among
comparable Great Lakes and New England industrial states.8 Dur-
ing the same period, Ohio's per patient per day expenditures were
about three-fourths the national average.' As the authors recog-
nize, Ohio ranks 12th to 14th nationally in per capita income.'0
Thus, the reasons for such niggardly spending cannot be based on
the poverty of its citizens.
An example of the shortsighted use of funds by Ohio can be
5 V. VICTOROFF & H. Ross, supra note 1, at 5-6.
61d. at 30.
7 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUc, & WELFARE, MEN-
TAL HEALTH STATISTICS, CURRENT FACILITY REPORTS - STATE AND COUNTY
MENTAL HoSPITALS, July 1, 1966-June 30, 1967, ser. MHB-H-12, Table 1, at 9
(Jan. 1968).
8Id. Comparative dollar per patient per day figures are as follows:
Conn. 11.24 Mich. 9.73 Pa. 8.19
IIl. 11.12 Wis. 9.55 N. Y. 7.69
Mass. 10.25 N. J. 8.95 Ohio 6.83
Minn. 9.89 Ind. 8.42
Alaska ranks first in the country with $32.37; Colorado is a distant second
with $21.10. At the other end of the scale are Alabama and Mississippi with
$4.30 and $3.99 respectively.
9Id. The national average for this period was $8.84 per patient per day; Ohio's
average was $6.83.
10 V. VICTOROFF & H. Ross, supra note 1, at 6.
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found in the relatively new 92-bed psychiatric hospital for children
at Sagamore Hills.11  Due to a lack of personnel - or more pre-
cisely, a lack of funds - this facility has never been fully occupied,
and the present occupancy rate is about 65 percent of capacity.Y
Another example of inadequate funding can be seen in the situa-
tion where emotionally disturbed children over 12 years of age are
taken to the juvenile court for help. One form of assistance, con-
sidered by some experts to be the most desirable,'" is placement in a
private residential treatment center. However, the juvenile court
can only exercise this option for that part of the year for which
funds are available. In both 1969 and 1970 the $764,000 allocated
was gone in less than 6 months.14
Apart from their failure to elaborate upon Ohio's disgraceful
mental health situation, the authors passed up an opportunity to
compare Ohio's efforts in this area with those of the more enlight-
ened states. 5 Misery of the magnitude that exists in Ohio's mental
institutions deserves every available forum. Unless the public is
made aware of the deficiencies which exist in treatment of the
mentally ill, the impetus for improvement may never materialize.
In fairness to the authors, however, it was their stated purpose
not to judge, but rather to describe and explain Ohio's mental
health alternatives and legal implications. This they have done
'well, and their product is a valuable addition to anyone's library.
But the existence of alternatives should not lead one to believe that
the treatment afforded by Ohio is satisfactory. The choice is all
too often between grossly inadequate alternatives.
VILmA L. KOHN*
11 For some facts about this facility, see V. VicroRolF & H. Ross, supra note 1,
app. 2, at 256-57.
12 Interview with Dr. Rachel Baker, Assistant Clinical Professor in Child Psychiatry
at Case Western Reserve University, School of Medicine, Cleveland, Ohio, in Cleveland,
Ohio, Sept. 11, 1970.
1 3 Interview with Dr. Larry Schreiber, Child Psychiatrist, Hanna Pavilion, Univer-
sity Hospitals, Cleveland, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio, Sept. 11, 1970.
14 Interview with John J. Alden, Director of Social Services, Juvenile Court, Cleve-
land, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio, Sept. 11, 1970.
15 For example, Massachusetts provides either residential or day-care treatment for
all children excluded from school because of emotional difficulties. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 71, §§ 46H, 461 (1969). Although the Cuyahoga County Board of Educa-
tion has estimated that 1 to 3 percent of the county's school children need to be placed
outside the school, and 1 percent absolutely need residential treatment, Ohio has no
comparable provisions. Interview with Dr. Rachel Baker, supra note 12.
* B.A., M.A., University of Buffalo; Ph. D., University of Michigan; presently a
third-year student at Case Western Reserve University, School of Law.
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LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. Edited by Lawrence
Friedman and Stewart Macaulay. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. 1969. Pp. xxxv, 1059. $14.50.
The significance of this extensive and varied collection of be-
havioral studies concerning the legal process is fully appreciated only
when one considers the existing state of legal education. Articles
concerning legal education are wont to speak of the ferment brew-
ing in law schools. In recent years it has appeared that the pot is
about to boil over. Read the well reasoned and documented critique
of our law schools by Professor Paul Savoy if you are not already
aware of the extent to which law schools are viewed by many as
"places where old men in their twenties go to die."'
In the past the response of law faculties to criticism of teaching
methods has been to propose packaging the old wine in new bottles
by substituting the problem method or clinical approach for the tra-
ditional case method. The substantive emphasis remains unchanged.
The student must learn the art of lawyering, and this requires at-
tention to the traditional "hard core" areas of the law. For those
who have experienced the delight of spinning the seamless web of
the law by manipulating analogies and drawing mind-expanding
distinctions such as that which differentiates an executory interest
in the nature of a shifting use from a contingent remainder, it is.
hard to see how a young law student would object to learning to
"think like a lawyer." Some, however, think that undue emphasis
on exegeses of appellate opinions serves to sharpen the mind by nar-
rowing it. Indeed, a few are bold enough to suggest that the typi-
cal law school curriculum is "too rigid, too uniform, too narrow,
too repetitious and too long."2 For these few, the legal scholar all
too frequently fits Archibald MacLeish's characterization: "The
scholar digs his ivory cellar in the ruins of the past and lets the pres-
ent sicken as it will."'3
Some attribute the tension that now exists in our law school
enterprises to the new breed of students who, raised in a Spockian,
1 Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 462 (1970).
For a similar although less extreme critique, see Watson, Quest for Professional Compe-
tence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93 (1968). For an
earlier comment on the failure of law faculties to apply basic learning principles in legal
education, see Kelso, Science and Our Teaching Methods: Harmony or Discord?, 13
J. LEGAL ED. 183 (1960). See also Kelso, Behavioral Psychology: Springhoard for
Imaginative Legal Educators, 45 DENVER L.J. 313 (1968).
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, REPORT OF
COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM 1, 8 (1968).
3 A. MACLEISH, THE IRRESPONSIBLES 26 (1940).
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permissive milieu, are incapable of exercising the self-discipline
necessary for the completion of a rigorous program of education.
My own personal experience, and that of others, indicates that this
hypothesis widely misses the mark4
The thesis advanced here is that the present crisis arose because
the emphasis in law school curricula has remained relatively un-
changed in the last 30 years, even though our conception of law
has undergone a radical transformation. The teachings of the real-
ists, sociological jurisprudents, jurimetricians, and judicial behav-
ioralists have impelled not only legal scholars, but lawyers and
judges as well, to reject the views that law is a discoverable entity
and that judges arrive at decisions through mere manipulation of
legal rules and principles.5 Instead, the law is viewed today from a
functional perspective. Geoffrey Hazard suggests that our present
jurisprudential outlook on the nature of law invites
a pervasive assimilation of social science and legal criticism, schol-
arship and education. If, as someone has observed, lawyers are
social scientists of necessity, it is time that they became better ones
than they have been. To do so entails more than taking findings
from social science, as in taking findings from the weather bureau.
It requires sympathetic.. . comprehension of the theory and ethos
of social science disciplines, of the origins and development of the
questions that concern them, of the premises and methodology of
their processes of inquiry.6
If we now accept a concept of law which admits that it is constantly
recreated within the context of transacting legal, social, and be-
havioral systems, how is it possible to retain a curriculum that deals
so minimally with the relevant processes and variables? 'In addition,
it is clear that practically speaking the courtship of law and science
has progressed to the point where the offspring are arriving, whether
or not they are legitimized by law school curriculum committees.
Consider the relevance of social science findings and techniques to
the determination of adjudicative and legislative facts (statistics and
discrimination in selection of juries and in reapportionment; eco-
nomic theory and antitrust violations; sociology and family law;
modern logic and drafting techniques and interpretation of docu-
ments). Or consider the impact of the prodigious prot6ge of scien-
4 See Forward to CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL O1 THE FUTURE,
5, 8 (E. Kitch ed. 1970).
5 See, e.g., Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CAsE W. REs. I. REv.
528, 540-43 (1968).
OHazard, Challenges to Legal Education, in THE PATH OF LAW FROM 1968, at 185,
191 (1968).
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tific technology - the computer. There are endless examples of the
ways in which the law must deal with scientific advances.7 But what
do we find when a survey is made of the state of legal education?
As a profession, law is concerned, of course, with human relation-
ships, and one might logically expect to find behavioral sciences
treated as basic disciplines for the preparation of lawyers. Yet, for
reasons that lie in the history of the legal profession and of uni-
versity disciplines, law schools do not employ social scientists to
any great extent, nor are they deeply involved in what is ordinarily
considered social science research.8
Given our schizophrenic attitude toward law and legal education,
is it any wonder that criticism is reaching the boiling point? But
how is one to implement a program to train law students in the new
social science methods and to provide them with access to the more
relevant findings of these disciplines? Certainly the publication of
Law and the Behavioral Sciences is a step in the right direction.
Hopefully, it will not meet the fate of Glendon Schubert's helpful
text, Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, which
received such a warm reception on its publication in 1964 that it was
out of print a few years later.9
But, realistically, are law faculties and students prepared for a
course using Law and the Behavioral Sciences? There are numerous
points in this text that require an understanding of statistical infer-
ence, beyond that gained in a first course in statistics, to develop a
meaningful critique of the conclusions of the studies presented.Y0
How is it possible to discuss the validity of the Pareto optimality
without a first course in decision theory like that offered at Yale Law
School ?11 Indeed, each chapter in Law and the Behavioral Sciences
7 See S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PRocEss FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 29-33
(1969); Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
361, 362-63 (1970).
8 NATIONAL AcADEMY OF SCIENCES & SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REPORT ON THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES: OUTLOOK AND NEEDS 184
(1969).
9 In 1965 I suggested that the primary significance of Schubert's text was "its po-
tentiality for instructing critics in precisely what the behavioralists are trying to accom-
plish. Hopefully, with understanding will come a reduction in hostility and a greater
rapport between law-trained persons and judicial behavioralists, and ultimately the long-
awaited integration of law and the other social sciences." Lewis, Book Review, 20
RUTGERS L. REV. 162, 170 (1965). I now view my optimistic prognostication as hope-
lessly naive.
10 See, e.g., Berkowitz & Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, in LAW AND THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 198 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969).
11 See Buchanan & Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, in LAw AND THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 57, 67 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969). The Yale course is "aimed
primarily at giving a background in model building problems and the concepts of con-
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merits a separate course, and in some cases several preparatory
courses.
The sequence starts with the threshold question of how one
delineates the legal system from the systems with which it transacts.
Traditionally this topic is dealt with extensively in a jurisprudence
course. Perhaps the careful attention given to the "'concept of law"
in most such courses would justify suggesting that a student would
profit more from a social science text if he had completed a good
course in jurisprudence. As Professor Harry W. Jones has noted,
"[c]ontemporary scholarship in the sociology of law is making in-
sufficient use of jurisprudential insights as hypotheses for empirical
investigation and verification."' 2  The obvious reason for this state
of affairs is that very few individuals have any in-depth knowledge
of both legal philosophy and social science.13
The remaining chapters deal with questions that the functional
approach compels us to answer. For example, how does the law ac-
tually operate in the social system? It is difficult to imagine how
a contracts teacher could ignore an article -like Macaulay's Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,'4 which re-
veals:
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or
potential or actual legal sanctions. There is hesitancy to speak of
legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations. Even where
the parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement which
indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on
time, often they will never refer to the agreement but will negoti-
ate a solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had
never been any original contract. One purchasing agent expressed
a common business attitude when he said, "if something comes up,
you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the problem.
You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever
want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants
to stay in business because one must behave decently."' 15
flict theory, including a basis of game theory, bargaining, and strategic analysis."
Bulletin of Yale University, Aug. 1969, at 45.
12 Jones, A View From the Bridge, LAW & SOCY REV. 39, 41 (Summer Supp. 1965)
(emphasis omitted).
1S Glendon Schubert notes: "[L]egal sociology .. . labors under the constraining
handicap that most persons who become law professors are poorly trained as sociologists;
it is hardly surprising, therefore, that many of the attempts to date, by law professors
who have endeavored to do sociological research on legal problems, have not yet become
noted for their empirical contributions to either law or sociology." Schubert, From
Area Study to Mathematical Theory, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 3, 5 (G.
Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969).
14 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, in LAW
AND THE BEHAVIORAL ScIENcEs 145 (L Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969).
15Id. at 155.
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In subsequent chapters the text sets forth studies dealing with the
impact of law on society, the impact of society on law, the legal
system as a social system, and the relationship of law to culture and
history. It is apparent that several courses would not exhaust the
subject matter alluded to in these studies.
The topic that might initially appear least significant, that of
comparative law, is essential to the behavioral enterprise, since "no
comparison of a single pair of natural objects is interpretable."16
Thus, legal scholars are becoming interested in comparative law
not only in its own right but also as a means of verifying hypotheses
concerning causal relations.17  Schubert suggests that there is value
in comparative studies of "primitive" tribes since "[s]uch analyses
of microcosmic social systems may suggest hypotheses about funda-
mental communalities in the behavior of human beings with stat-
uses and roles in judicial systems, even when such a system is so
undifferentiated that we can observe only the judicial function be-
cause no judicial structure is manifest.' 18
Ideally, prior to taking a course using this text a student would
have acquired a sufficient understanding of behavioralism to appreci-
ate the difficulties involved in assessing the scientific validity of the
studies - both from a methodological and from a substantive view-
point. The student should be aware of the significance of the dis-
tinction between systems transacting as opposed to reacting. He
should surely appreciate when equilibrium, homeostatic, and mor-
phogenetic models are appropriate. The Whorfian hypothesis and
its attendant assumptions, as opposed to Chomsky's thesis, should be
in his store of knowledge. He might not be expected to know the
Scheherazade effect,' 9 but he should certainly know the import of
the more significant behavioral variables that can invalidate studies,
including the Halo effect, Hawthorne effect, Rosenthal effect, sub-
stantive Heisenberg analogue, regression problem, ceteris paribus
16 Campbell, The Mutual Methodological Relevance of Anthropology and Psychol-
ogy, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 333, 344 (F. Hsu ed. 1961) (emphasis
omitted).
17 See Schubert, supra note 13, at 5. See also Lempert, Strategies of Research
Design in the Legal Impact Study, 1 LAw & Soc'y REV. 111 (1966). The problem of
regression and other difficulties involved in controlling for plausible rival hypotheses
are set forth in Campbell & Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time-
Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, in LAw AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
374 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969).
18 Schubert, Cultural Anthropology and Judicial Systems, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:
A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 84,85 (G. Schubert ed. 1964).
19See Goldiamond, Self-Control Procedures in Personal Behavior Problems, 17
PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 851, 855-56 (1965).
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problem, the idiographic problem, the conflict between phenomenol-
ogy and phenomenalism, the competing fallacies of reductionism
and reification, and the Verstehen problem, to mention only a few.
Ideally, a student should have participated in a clinical project in
which he designed a study, since, as with lawyering, "[t]his ability
to deal with specific problems is something that perhaps can only
be learned by doing .... ."10
The primary criticism then that emerges from a reading of Law
and the Behavioral Sciences is not of the text but of the law schools.
They are not yet ready for this text. The faculties are generally
neither prepared nor interested in deviating radically from the tra-
ditional approach that has made legal education what it is today.
The curriculum still emphasizes analysis ad nauseum of desiccated
appellate opinions.21 Occasionally there are course offerings in
social sciences, but the bulk of the curriculum, especially at the
middle-range law schools, remains dedicated to the traditional
courses as though the schools were totally committed to the policy
expressed in Samuel Hoffenstein's immortal "Come weal, come woe,
my status is quo."
OvID C. LEwis*
2 0 Edwards, Experiments: Their Planning and Execution, in I HANDBooK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 259,285 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954).
21 Professor Kitch provides us with at least a partial answer as to why this is true:
"It becomes quickly obvious that if the social science skills are the relevant skills, they
are not skills that the typical American law teacher has mastered." E. KITCH, supra
note 4, at 10-11.
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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